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The last speaker at a daylong conference is never in an enviable
position. This is particularly true when the earlier talks are on challenging
economic topics and the speakers are knowledgeable, as has been the case
today. My topic, the role of the Reserve Banks, is an important one, but
it has the potential to be interesting to a smaller group of people, at best.
To address the downside of my slot and topic, I am going to be
intentionally provocative. That does not mean untrue or extreme, but
rather that I plan on emphasizing ideas I hope will stimulate response
and further discussion.
AS UMMARY OF MY POSITION
The Federal Reserve needs to balance independence and political
accountability in order to conduct monetary policy effectively. I believe
that involvement in the monetary policy process by Reserve Banks, with
their considerable operational responsibilities and largely autonomous
governance structures, has helped to achieve a successful balance. In
particular, the operational responsibilities and autonomy of the Reserve
Banks has contributed to the stature of their presidents, thereby support-
ing, albeit indirectly, the presidents’ participation in Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC) deliberations and making credible their
commitments to a low-inﬂation policy. But political accountability re-
quires that the Federal Reserve carry out its responsibilities in a cost-
efﬁcient manner. Inefﬁciency in Federal Reserve operations is indefensible
and potentially invites political intervention.
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have involved and must continue to involve centralization and special-
ization, given the new technologies of ﬁnancial services and ongoing
changes in the structure of the industry. Maintaining a system where
decentralized, autonomous Reserve Banks carry out signiﬁcant opera-
tions risks overemphasizing independence at the expense of accountabil-
ity. Indeed, I believe that going forward the case may well be made that
Federal Reserve operational responsibilities focus increasingly narrowly
on interbank payments services.
The Federal Reserve System does have options for maintaining and
possibly bolstering the stature of the Reserve Banks in a time of
diminishing operational responsibilities. The analytical and research
capabilities of the Banks have increased and can be strengthened further.
I believe that the resulting intellectual contributions can provide Reserve
Bank presidents with some of the stature needed for internal and external
credibility.
DO RESERVE BANK OPERATIONS MATTER TO MONETARY
POLICY?
The Federal Reserve needs to be sufﬁciently independent to maintain
a credible, low-inﬂation policy. A credible commitment to low inﬂation
may require the Federal Reserve to take politically and economically
controversial decisions, decisions that elected ofﬁcials in the executive or
legislative branches of the government might seek to inﬂuence or to
forestall. If successful, such inﬂuence would reduce the credibility of the
Federal Reserve and ultimately lead to inﬂation.
At the same time, the Federal Reserve needs to be accountable in
order to effectively carry out monetary policy. Given our democracy, the
Fed cannot stand beyond the review of the public, elected ofﬁcials, and
the political process. The justiﬁcation for accountability goes beyond the
ethos of representative democracy. In fact, accountability should make it
easier for the Federal Reserve to establish a credible low-inﬂation policy.
The public will better understand an accountable, open organization and
put more trust in its decisions. What is perhaps more important, an
emphasis on accountability should reduce the chance that the Federal
Reserve will engage in misuse of public resources or appear incompetent
or inefﬁcient in carrying out its tasks. As a result, elected ofﬁcials will
have less reason to intervene and threaten Federal Reserve independence.
Although independence and accountability both contribute to effec-
tive monetary policy, there are trade-offs between the two. The Board of
Governors, for example, has several features that contribute to indepen-
dence, including off-budget status and long-term appointments for the
governors. However, the appointment process, frequent testimony before
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Washington assure the Board’s public accountability.
If the Board of Governors is a primary source of accountability, I
believe the Reserve Banks are a critical source of independence and, in
particular, that the Bank presidents add credibility to monetary policy
commitments. To play this role effectively, the presidents must have
stature, and, in turn, the stature of the president emanates both from
those who ﬁll the position and from the position itself. The position of
president historically comes with signiﬁcant responsibilities and a high
community proﬁle.
I believe the operational responsibilities of the Reserve Banks have
been valuable both in attracting talent to the presidency and in giving the
position stature. In particular, the weight of the operational responsibil-
ities, and the fact that the president leads a large complex organization,
help attract strong candidates. The responsibilities are particularly im-
portant given that accountability leads to relatively low salaries (by
private sector standards). Being the head of a large organization with
private-ﬁrm-like responsibilities also gives the position stature in the
community. The fact that the Reserve Banks have some powers similar to
those of commercial banks and a private-ﬁrm-like corporate governance
structure helps distinguish them from typical government agencies
subject to political control.
The stature of the presidents and the Reserve Banks, resulting in part
from the Banks’ operational responsibilities, helps attract capable indi-
viduals to Board of Directors’ positions. This is signiﬁcant in that it gives
the Banks and their presidents more stature and inﬂuence in setting
monetary policy and communicating that policy to the public. The
directors can also directly assist in giving the Reserve Banks a public face.
In summary, I view the Reserve Bank presidents as being particu-
larly important in establishing a credible monetary policy because of their
relative independence and stature, and I believe that the operational
responsibilities of the Banks contribute to those characteristics. Assigning
Reserve Bank operations a prominent, albeit indirect, role in effective
monetary policy suggests that changes to such operations should be rare
and made with caution. But the need to balance independence and
accountability means that we cannot defend and maintain those features
of the Federal Reserve System that contribute to independence without
regard to cost.
THE COSTS OF MAINTAINING DECENTRALIZED RESERVE
BANK OPERATIONS
Successful conduct of monetary policy requires a long-run balance
between independence and accountability. Achieving the latter requires
cost-effective operations. Maintaining signiﬁcant operational autonomy
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effective operations, because of advances in the technology of ﬁnancial
services provision and, more generally, because the market for payments
services has changed appreciably. Sticking with the old regime could
ultimately threaten Federal Reserve independence by generating unsat-
isfactory ﬁnancial results or by inviting political scrutiny and external
reform.
Advances in communication and information-processing technology
have raised the minimum efﬁcient scale for the types of processing
operations the Fed carries out. Centralization of activity is thus necessary
to exploit scale economies and drive costs down. The Federal Reserve
would be manifestly and transparently cost-inefﬁcient without such
centralization.
Other factors also push Federal Reserve operations toward central-
ization and a corresponding diminution in Reserve Bank autonomy.
Changes in technology have led commercial banks that are both custom-
ers and competitors of the Federal Reserve to increase the scale of their
activities. The largest commercial banks control an ever-increasing share
of banking activities and now operate nationally. As a result, the Federal
Reserve must serve these large banks on a consistent, national basis. A
single Reserve Bank could not meet the full range of needs of such
customers without coordinating products and policies across all Reserve
Banks or sharing facilities outright. Such steps naturally lead to a
reduction in independence of Reserve Bank actions and budgets. In
addition, as these large commercial banks or associations of banks take
advantage of scale economies, they become more cost-effective competi-
tors. The contrast between these institutions and the Federal Reserve’s
more decentralized approach may become hard to justify, if it is not
already.
Changes in the legal environment have reinforced the need to
respond to advances in technology. The Monetary Control Act (MCA)
formalized congressional expectations of accountability for Federal Re-
serve operations, and the MCA compels us to move to cost-effective
technologies or to price ourselves out of business.
This commentary is hardly news to those within the Federal Reserve
System or to astute external observers. Indeed, the establishment of
Federal Reserve Automated Services (FRAS), the product ofﬁces, the
Financial Services Policy Committee (FSPC), and, most recently, the check
standardization effort reﬂect a shift to operations on a larger scale, greater
coordination of products and policies, and a general recognition that
individual Reserve Banks cannot maintain previous levels of autonomy
and responsibility.
Although signiﬁcant, the changes already made by the Federal
Reserve will likely be only the ﬁrst of many that reduce the operational
autonomy and responsibility of the Reserve Banks. I believe that the
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justify a decentralized operational structure going forward, even with the
beneﬁts it provides. For example, I believe that the check processing
business of the Federal Reserve at some point will face a serious threat
from the growth of electronic payments. More generally, the current
period of innovation raises doubt about the ability of the Federal Reserve
to remain an effective, long-run participant in this business. Much of this
skepticism comes from an assessment of the ability of our organization,
with its government-like incentives, ﬁnancing arrangements, and pro-
cesses, to respond quickly and effectively to innovation. Our legal
cost-recovery mandate, for example, could hinder our ability to make the
necessary capital investments. Such investments are costly and the
Federal Reserve budget is only so “elastic.” In the aggregate, payments
services providers in the private sector are far larger entities, which are
likely to undertake riskier, potentially higher-return investments and
then simply cut their losses on those that fail.
An alternative view suggests that the long history of Federal Reserve
innovation, combined with a commitment to efﬁciency, can leave Reserve
Banks with some considerable operational role. I am skeptical of this
conclusion, believing that the Federal Reserve may have a relatively
narrow comparative advantage with regard to payments, at least as
technology and the marketplace are now evolving. Because specialization
promotes efﬁciency, I would argue that the Federal Reserve should focus
on those activities closely related to its core functions. The central bank
appears to have a comparative advantage in interbank payments, but it is
far from obvious that it has an advantage in other payments areas,
particularly in the prospective retail payments arena. Taking steps to
maintain a presence in areas where the Federal Reserve does not
currently have a comparative advantage or where that advantage is
eroding rapidly would be inconsistent with public accountability. I am
not suggesting that the Fed exit current lines of business, but rather I
suggest that aggressive steps to stay in those lines when innovation and
private competition diminish our role are not appropriate.
INTELLECTUAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND STATURE OF THE
SYSTEM
Much of this discussion might be viewed as simply a story about
adjustments the Federal Reserve System has made and will continue to
make to its role in payments, were it not for the concern that a reduction
in operational responsibility and autonomy ultimately could adversely
affect the conduct of monetary policy. The issue is this: As payments
operations decline in importance, do other, appropriate activities exist
that, if emphasized, would maintain the viability of the Reserve Banks
and support their role of leadership in monetary policy?
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beyond payments have changed in the Federal Reserve over, say, the past
twenty years since the passage of the MCA. Speciﬁcally, monetary policy
has taken on far greater visibility and importance. It is now generally
recognized that inﬂation is an important and difﬁcult problem and that
monetary policy is the tool with which to address it. The importance
accorded monetary policy provides Reserve Bank leadership and staff
with a platform from which to publicize their research and analysis.
Making intellectual and policy contributions becomes easier when the
audience is predisposed to view your organization and your work as
signiﬁcant. And the importance of monetary policy raises the stature of
those involved in it.
The intellectual contributions of the Reserve Banks go beyond
monetary policy. They have supervisory responsibilities that they likely
will retain. The presidents will remain party to deliberations on the
management of systemic crises. Such involvement in the ﬁnancial sector
has given Reserve Bank staff a clear reason to analyze a wide range of
topics, including those involving banking, capital markets, and payments
systems. The link between the setting of monetary policy and almost any
topic related to domestic and international economic performance, in-
cluding distributional concerns, makes it even more natural for Reserve
Bank staff to take on a broad array of topics. As a result, the Fed has
become credible on a large number of issues, assuming almost a “national
resource” role. Thus, our emphasis on intellectual contribution ﬁts solidly
with expectations about the type of activity the Federal Reserve will carry
out. That is, a role in intellectual leadership is not at odds with political
accountability. (Obviously, carried to extremes in stafﬁng and expense,
research and analysis would not be consistent with accountability,
however.)
In summary, I believe the increased intellectual and public presence
of the Reserve Banks could effectively substitute as a source of stature as
their operational activities diminish. The research and analytical capabil-
ities of the Reserve Banks provide the presidents and their institutions
with an independent voice with regard to monetary policy and other
issues, thus adding to their credibility with the public and at the FOMC.
The intellectual contributions of the Reserve Banks also help to attract
top-ﬂight directors and presidents. Finally, their publications and re-
search give the Reserve Banks a public face and are vehicles for effective
communication.
However, it is not clear that intellectual contributions will prove
entirely adequate in replacing the role of operations. One concern is that
the Reserve Banks will come to look like think tanks. Such a label could
suggest that their presidents do not have signiﬁcant responsibilities. The
think-tank badge also implies a lack of real world grounding. This would
leave the Federal Reserve open to charges that it is divorced from reality.
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emphasizing intellectual contributions could even put the Reserve Banks
in the middle of highly charged political debates.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL RESERVE
POLICY
The role of the Reserve Banks in the Federal Reserve System is in
transition. Their operational autonomy and responsibilities have helped
to achieve a balance between independence and accountability, but it is
no longer tenable to maintain former degrees of autonomy and respon-
sibility in operations. One option to maintain and, indeed, to strengthen
the Reserve Banks is to emphasize their policy-related intellectual contri-
butions.
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